There is a theory that there are Iraqi fingerprints in the 1993 attack. You have recently suggested that evidence linking the 1993 WTC attack to Iraq was overlooked during the investigation process.
What I've said was that the original investigator for the FBI in 1993 to early 1994, Jim Fox, had those suspicions. After Fox was retired, the U.S. government prosecution veered off to another theory, namely that this was a network of terrorists inspired by the blind sheik [Omar Rahman], more or less abandoning the approach of looking for ties to Iraq. None of this was available to anyone outside the small circle of prosecutors and the FBI till after the trials were finished. That was a rule of law, not a policy decision.
Going back to the Iraq business: Opponents of attacking Iraq argue that containment might be a better tool than pursuing a military strategy.
What Saddam wants to do is to dominate that portion of the world, its oil supplies and his neighbors, and he is working hard on weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in order to do it. He certainly would threaten American forces in the Middle East. As we said in the [congressional] Rumsfeld Commission, it would be a few years -- after North Korea and Iran -- before he is able to build several stage ballistic missiles that would reach the U.S. (Keep in mind that as poor a country as North Korea, which has nowhere near the wealth and scientific knowledge of Iraq, has been able to construct a three-stage missile.) People who believe that this problem is decades away are simply wrong and don't understand how ballistic missiles work.
Meanwhile we know very little about the inner workings of the Iraqi regime. How is our intelligence on Iraq these days?
Until early '95 it was reasonably good, but could have been better. A lot of useful information was turned up by U.N. inspectors. Since early 1995, you have to ask [former CIA Director John] Deutch and [current CIA Director George] Tenet.
No country in the Middle East today -- at least no Arab country -- supports attacking Iraq. What would such a step mean for U.S. interests in the region and to the U.S.-led coalition on terrorism?
I think one nutty way to make foreign policy is to collect a large number of nations and decide to do what the lowest common denominator wants. If you approach foreign policy and security policy that way, you'll never accomplish anything. What we have to do is to decide what is in our interests and what needs to be done and then go to the countries whose help we want -- and only Turkey's help is essential in this matter -- tell them what we want, and ask for their assistance. I've been in four different jobs in the executive branch over the years dealing with allies, and it's been my universal experience that allies respond far more helpfully when the United States takes a strong position of leadership than they do when the U.S. goes to them hat in hand and says, "We don't know what we want to do. What do you think?" It's an especially bad idea to start with the need for a numerically large coalition to do what the most fainthearted of those is willing to support.
Speaking of coalitions, much criticism has surfaced lately of the strongest U.S. ally in the region, Saudi Arabia. Do you think U.S. policy toward this regime needs to be reconsidered?
The Saudis are the last country I would go to hat in hand and go along with their initial inclination. The Saudis are a huge part of the problem that all good countries face as a result of what happened in this part of the world. The Saudis have exported a lot of money to support an extreme form of Islamist philosophy, if you can call it that. The madrasas they supported in Pakistan are a major source for the Taliban, and much of the money for al-Qaida has come from Saudi Arabia. We would ultimately be better off with a democratic Saudi Arabia than we would with a ruling family that has done what this one has and bought off the Islamic extremists and terrorists by pointing them towards us. Saudis deserve a very large part of the blame for Sept. 11, and I do not think we should do anything more with them right now than be cordial.
But a regime change in Iraq would ultimately destabilize the Saudi government.
The world would be much better off with democratic regimes in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Mideast. Those who believe we have to go along with dictatorships and authoritarian regimes because such and such a country or culture can't understand democracy are flatly wrong.
But we have yet to see an Islamic regime that is also a democracy. There isn't yet a democratic version of Islam.
Certainly there is. Look at Bangladesh. Look at the reforms on Bahrain. There are certain features of Islam that are different on this issue from other religions -- perhaps [there is] less of a tradition of the separation of church and state. But I don't see why Islamic countries can't be democracies. We owe the people the respect to let them figure out how to choose their rulers.
About the writer
Asla Aydintasbas is a New York journalist. Her writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the International Herald Tribune, the New York Times and other publications.
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