What one needs to do is to support the democratic opposition armed uprising in the North and the South; to destroy his land forces with air power, as has been demonstrated in Afghanistan to be extremely effective; and to look for defections from his regular army into the ranks of the rebels. That's a reasonable approach.
We are talking about one of the strongest armies in the region.
His army is half strength or less since 1991 and the only troops he can count on are the Republican Guard, and I'm not sure he can completely count on them. We've gone from having 10 percent smart weapons in 1991 to having 90 percent smart weapons in Afghanistan. The devastating impact of that has been clear to everyone. It now takes an average of two weapons to destroy a target, compared to 10 weapons 10 years ago.
You assign a key role to the Iraqi opposition, and particularly the Iraqi National Congress led by Ahmad Chalabi, in overthrowing the regime there. But some -- again, including high-ranking State Department officials -- express doubts about the opposition's capacity to deliver this, especially given that they don't have a military presence on the ground.
These opponents of the INC are too cowardly to use their own names [in interviews and statements]. I am not. That should raise a question mark about the credibility of what they say about anybody.
It's hard to even imagine that the U.S. can topple Saddam without putting troops on the ground.
U.S. engagement has to be absolutely serious, but it doesn't need to be anywhere near the 500,000 troops that we used in the Gulf War. I think we could have American assistance and there has to be some ground forces over and above the special forces of the sort that have been used in Afghanistan ... Once we have destroyed his defenses, that means we have destroyed a great deal of his army and the Republican Guard from the air.
We are, of course, talking about a guy who has chemical, biological and at this point possibly nuclear capabilities. Who is to say he'll fight a future war your way? Isn't there a possibility that, given his capabilities, if attacked, Saddam Hussein could unleash a serious biological attack on neighboring countries?
For those who are afraid to confront Saddam today because he may have weapons of mass destruction, I'd ask them what makes them think it's going to get easier. It's getting worse every day in terms of his work on weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of ever-longer ranges. That's why it's important to move against him sooner rather than later.
We've done a very bad thing in the 1990s by the Clinton administration being so feckless and flaccid in dealing with Iraq for eight years. We are in a much more dangerous situation today than we were eight, nine years ago. It'll be even more dangerous tomorrow.
During 1993-1995, you were part of that administration as the CIA chief. Wasn't what you called a "feckless and flaccid" policy in place at the time?
It started when President Clinton decided to respond to the attempt to assassinate former President Bush in the spring of 1993 merely by shooting two dozen cruise missiles into an empty building in the middle of the night. I think killing some night watchman and Iraqi cleaning women had the opposite effect on Saddam that one would want.
Were you not part of the group of advisors that decided on that action?
Those decisions were not made on the advice of the people who are involved with intelligence. Indeed, the intelligence agencies during the Clinton administration were told they were not to give policy advice.
But surely you cannot put the blame on the Clinton administration and try to keep out the CIA?
I can tell you that they were not instrumental in making any decision between 1993 and early 1995. After that you'll have to ask my successors. No advice of the intelligence agencies was asked at that decision.
Of course the first World Trade Center attack and the following investigation took place under your watch.
As far as the WTC bombing of 1993 was concerned, all the information that was collected by law enforcement was kept under grand jury secrecy. The intelligence agencies were not permitted by law to see it until the trials of conspirators like Ramzi Yousef were completed. That was the way that the Clinton administration chose to approach acts of terrorism. As law enforcement matters and not as acts of security.
You put a lot of blame on the Clinton administration. But doesn't the principal blame for Saddam's survival fall on the first Bush administration, which, instead of toppling him, left Saddam in place out of deference to regimes in the region, like the Saudis, that fear democracy in Iraq?
The first Bush administration made a serious error in judgment in not supporting Iraqi opposition after the war. The Clinton administration made eight years of that.
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